President of the Board of the Polish Free and Open Source Software Foundation. Human rights in digital era hacktivist, Free Software advocate, privacy and anonimity evangelist; expert volunteer to the Panoptykon Foundation; co-organizer of SocHack social hackathons; charter member of the Warsaw Hackerspace; and Telecomix co-operator; biker, sailor.

Formerly CTO of BRAMA Mobile Technologies Laboratory on Warsaw University of Technology and a student at Philosophy Institute on Warsaw University.

Former affiliations


Table of Contents

12.04.2014Irresponsible non-disclosure en pl 134 29.03.2014Ecologic, Ford and surveillance en pl 133 15.03.2014Otwórzmy edukację pl 132 10.03.2014Blurry line between private service and public infrastructure en 131 08.03.2014IM IN UR MINISTRY, CONSULTING UR INTERNETZ en pl 130 17.02.2014Encrypted VoIP that works en pl 129 11.02.2014So you want to censor the Internet... en pl 128 02.02.2014This is why we can't have nice IRC en 127 31.01.2014Decentralize where your mouth is en pl 126 30.01.2014A link cannot be illegal en pl 125 30.01.2014Copyright reform debate lives on en pl 124 26.01.2014Neat HaCSS, or let's de-JS the Web a bit en 123 27.12.2013Information Account Number en 122 14.12.2013HaIPu en 121 20.11.2013Friends of TTIP and data protection in Brussels en 120 19.11.2013Social media, Polish Pirates style en pl 119 05.11.2013A rude comment en 118 20.10.2013TEDx Warsaw Women and privacy en pl 117 03.10.2013Copyreform at CopyCamp 2013 en pl 116 22.09.2013Long-expected KMail2 rant en 115 18.09.2013Facebook for schools en 114 12.09.2013W którym wzywam posłów i posłanki Solidarnej Polski do zagwarantowania obywatelom Internetu wolnego od inwigilacji pl 113 08.09.2013Complaintivism en 112 04.09.2013It's his own fault en pl 111 19.08.2013Lies, damn lies, and analytics en pl 110 27.07.2013Shortest Internet censorship debate ever en pl 109 22.07.2013How information sharing uproots conservative business models en es 108 22.07.2013Posts' markup is now available en pl 107 07.06.2013Internet is not a problem en pl 105 05.06.2013Libel Culture en 104 17.05.2013Wojtuś Fatalista i wolność w Internecie pl 102 17.05.2013Why I find -ND unnecessary and harmful en es pl 101 28.03.2013Wolność nasza codzienna pl 100 17.03.2013Nie wszystko korpo co o wolności w Internecie pl 99 15.03.2013♫ Odpowiadam na e-maile ♫ pl 98 11.02.2013One year anniversary of Anti-ACTA en pl 97 30.01.2013Nie ma haka na słabe dziennikarstwo? pl 96 30.01.2013Fighting Black PR around OER en pl 95 29.01.2013HOWTO: effectively argue against Internet censorship ideas en 94 20.11.2012Border conditions for preserving subjectivity in the digital era en pl 93 19.11.2012Social blogosphere en pl 92 07.11.2012Embrace fragmentation en pl 91 02.11.2012SERVICES.TXT en pl 90 24.10.2012Apple finally jumped the shark en es 89 24.09.2012Breaking the garden walls en es pl 88 24.09.2012Minister i Kultura pl 87 24.09.2012Melbourne CryptoParty video message en 86 16.09.2012On sailor's sensitivity, or "the starry heavens above me" en pl 85 22.08.2012Black PR around Polish e-Textbooks en pl 84 15.08.2012Regaty utracone pl 83 24.07.2012Hypochristian Love en 82 24.07.2012Some new Layout Goodness en pl 81 17.07.2012Party 2.0 en pl 80 16.07.2012Prawo autorskie po ACTA pl 79 13.07.2012Party as a system hack en pl 78 10.06.2012Are corporations dangerous only in collusion with governments? en 77 09.06.2012Proxies! Proxies everywhere! en 76 05.06.2012Automagic re-publishing from Twitter to StatusNet en pl 75 18.05.2012TPSA/Orange and GIMP, or a word on 5 users en pl 74 16.05.2012Słowo o Warsztatach MAiC pl 73 15.04.2012Schowaj gadżeta pl 72 05.04.2012Perfect ToDo-oid en 71 27.03.2012Subjectively on Anti-ACTA in Poland en pl 70 25.03.2012On copyright in Budapest en pl 69 23.03.2012Kościoła poczucie odpowiedzialności pl 68 20.03.2012Learning to Internet en pl 67 19.03.2012Kościoła wiara w wiernych pl 66 29.02.2012Brussels Safari #1 - EP press conference and ITRE en pl 65 21.02.2012Because ACTA is passé en pl 64 20.02.2012Privacy of correspondence, EU-style en pl 63 17.02.2012Polish PM on ACTA: I was wrong en pl 62 12.02.2012Anonymous vs Corponymous en pl 61 10.02.2012To have a cookie and dowload it too en pl 60 19.01.2012About ACTA at Polish PM Chancellery en pl 59 19.01.2012Free as in United en pl 58 16.01.2012Towarzystwo czuje się oszukane pl 57 10.01.2012Terms of Using the Service en pl 56 05.01.2012Corporate lack of patriotism en pl 55 04.01.2012Terroristcopters en pl 54 03.01.2012IceWeasel and Privacy en pl 53 28.12.2011Good Uncle Stal... Putin en pl 52 25.12.2011Useful Bash defaults done right en 51 21.12.2011Google Mail, or how mail becomes publication en pl 50 20.12.2011Occupy Gotham en pl 49 11.12.2011Copyfraud en pl 48 08.12.2011Multikino Wikipedia FAIL pl 47 27.11.2011Nie miejsce na pl 46 18.11.2011One-way cutting en pl 45 12.11.2011Tolerancja dla Kościoła pl 44 11.11.2011Users and Citizens en pl 43 30.10.2011Adhocracy and Net4Change en pl 42 18.10.2011War on Fun en pl 41 16.10.2011Boli mnie w krzyżu pl 40 14.10.2011Technocomplacency en pl 39 10.10.2011I Can Haz? pl 37 09.10.2011Election Silence in Poland en pl 38 03.10.2011Kibice i kampania pl 36 02.10.2011E-textbooks, Johnny Mnemonic, business and the Net en pl 35 19.09.2011CC Global Streaming/Summit/Party pl 33 19.09.2011Czy jest coś takiego jak darmowe śniadanie? pl 34 12.09.2011Faktycznie Super pl 32 12.09.2011Diaspora-Based Comment System en 31 11.09.2011Conflict of values en pl 30 06.09.2011Wolność słowa to nie wolność od myślenia ani od krytyki pl 29 06.09.2011On-line privacy and anonymity: case in point en pl 28 04.09.2011On being careful with words en pl 27 03.09.2011W obronie QR Code pl 26 31.08.2011Stolica Nie Tak Święta pl 25 29.08.2011Of malware, hot steam, privacy, using one's brain and paedoparanoia en 24 29.08.2011Kragen Thinking Out Loud en pl 23 18.08.2011Ból, blizny, dziewczyny i wiosła pl 22 07.08.2011Worst. Woodstock. Ever! pl 21 27.07.2011Willpower, productivity and cycling en pl 20 19.07.2011Neo FreeRunner as a WiFi Soundcard en 19 10.07.2011A Weekend with lawyers en pl 18 09.07.2011One step closer to ideal en pl 17 04.07.2011Apostasy in Poland en pl 16 28.06.2011YAFR (Yet Another Facebook Rant) en pl 15 19.06.2011Wiara w priorytety pl 14 17.06.2011Important meetings, fun meetings en pl 13 13.06.2011Ooops I en pl 12 30.05.2011Playing with Node.js en pl 11 25.05.2011Mozilla, Google and the Location Bar en pl 10 24.05.2011At Sector 3.0 conf en pl 9 23.05.2011Layout, CSS and RSS/Atom en pl 8 15.05.2011Startup Weekend Network Fun Fun Fun en 7 11.05.2011Nowy szef Bramy pl 6 10.05.2011World's Smallest Open Source Violin en pl 5 10.05.2011Po kolejnym spotkaniu w KPRM pl 4 08.05.2011Inspiracja na niedzielę pl 3 08.05.2011I horizontally the whole blog is that serious pl 2 07.05.2011I can has brag en pl 1

Irresponsible non-disclosure

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Yesterday Bloomberg broke the news that NSA is said to had known about http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed Heartbleed] for months or years, without telling anybody — and the wheels of the media and blogosphere have started to churn out reactions from surprised through shocked to outraged.

Frankly, I am most surprised by the fact that anybody is surprised. After Snowden's revelations we all should have already gotten used to the fact that what once was a crazy tin-foil hat paranoia, today is entirely within the realm of possible.

Even less surprisingly, a quick dementi has been issued on behalf of the NSA. Regular smoke and mirrors, as anybody could have expected, but with one very peculiar — and telling — paragraph (emphasis mine):

In response to the recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, the White House has reviewed its policies in this area and reinvigorated an interagency process for deciding when to share vulnerabilities. This process is called the Vulnerabilities Equities Process. Unless there is a clear national security or law enforcement need, this process is biased toward responsibly disclosing such vulnerabilities.

What this means is that when a bug is found by a "security" agency, it might not get responsibly disclosed. If "there is a clear national security and law enforcement need", it might be used in a weaponized form instead.

With the "America under attack" mentality and the ongoing "War on Terror" waged across the globe, we can safely assume that there is "a clear national security need", at least in the minds of those making these decisions.

And we need to remember, that if there is a bug, and somebody has found it (but not disclosed it), somebody else will find it, eventually. It might be Neel Mehta or Marek Zibrow, who then discloses it responsibly; or it might be Joe Cracker, who exploits it or sells it to other shady organisations.

And because we all use the same encryption mechanisms, the same protocols and often the same implementations, it then will be used against us all.

Now, it is crucial to understand that it's not about NSA and Heartbleed. It's about all "security" agencies and any software bugs. By not responsibly disclosing discovered bugs "security" agencies make us all considerably less secure.

Regardless of whether NSA has or hasn't known about Heartbleed, such a non-disclosure policy is simply irresponsible — and unacceptable.

Ecologic, Ford and surveillance

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A few months ago Jim Farley, Ford representative, blurted in a panel at CES that:

We know everyone who breaks the law, we know when you're doing it. We have GPS in your car, so we know what you're doing. By the way, we don't supply that data to anyone.

Comments about where not very positive, to say the least, and both Mr Farley and Ford's PR manager retracted this statement immediately — underlining that gathered data would only be used after anonimisation, or only after explicit consent by the driver. In other words, "this is no surveillance".

Of course, once the data reaches Ford's servers the only thing keeping Ford from giving them away is their promise. Seems pretty thin to me — especially with the money insurance providers can throw at this (not to mention law enforcement).

Ford isn't the only company why strives to "help" drivers by gathering data on them. A Polish startup, Ecologic (winners of the Warsaw Startup Fest), had this to say (emphasis mine):

Damian Szymański, Gazeta.pl: What is Ecologic's idea and how can it help us all lower costs of using cars?

Emil Żak, Robert Bastrzyk: Today nobody keeps track of costs of using their cars. Turns out that annually it can add up to more than the value of the car itself. Tires, petrol, insurance, repairs, etc. It all costs. Our device analyses every action of the driver. It signalises what we have done wrong and suggests, what we can change to lower the costs of petrol, for example. Moreover, we have access to this data 24h.

Total surveillance?

Not at all. The question is how the driver drives their car. Ecologic is a mobile app, online portal and a device that you connect in your car. Thanks to that we can have all sorts of data, for example about combustion...

What kinds of data are collected? Ecologic's website claims that the device is "equipped with the motion sensor, accelerometer, SIM card, cellular modem and GPS", and that:

The system immediately begins recording operating data of the vehicle, the GPS position and driving techniques in real-time.

So the idea is to collect data like GPS position, acceleration and breaking, vehicle utilization, driving technique, and sending these off to Ecologic's servers. Seems that it doesn't differ wildly from what Ford has in stock, with an (apparently) nice addition of the driver being able to check on their data and stats. Sounds great!

However, a question arises: what happens with the data? Even if Ford's "promise" not to share with anybody seems thin, Ecologic doesn't even try to hide that the real money is in selling access to gathered data.

In the "For Who" (sic) section of their website we can find the real target group (emphasis mine):

Private users — keep an eye on the young driver in the family
Small business — fast and easy management of vehicles
Fleets — keep the fleet under control & save costs
Leasing Companies — lower the accident rate and track miles
Insurance — give discounts on no-claims & safe driving

Of course one very important group is missing from that list: I am sure law enforcement will be quick to understand the utility of requiring any and all cars install the device, and not having to deal with costly traffic enforcement cameras any more without losing the ability to issue speeding tickets. After all, would Ecologic deny access to data to law enforcement?

Ah, but the Ecologic cares about drivers' impression of being surveilled:

Your driver after work can switch off live tracking to feel conftable without impression that he is "spied". A button on the mobile app allows the driver to indicate that the current trip is personal and help you to track private km. (sic!)

So the driver can "switch off live tracking", but the system will nonetheless help you (i.e. the employer) track "private km"? So these data also have to land in Ecologic's servers, eh? Apart from the employer, who else will have access to this "private trip" data? Insurance companies? Law enforcement goes without saying, of course.

In the interview, Ecologic claims that:

It's all about motivation and healthy competition. We need to change the way we think. Instead of a stick, we want to give people two carrots.

It's a pity that for the drivers themselves this translates into three sticks — employer, insurance provider and law enforcement.

Otwórzmy edukację

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Wyobraźmy sobie, że chcemy kupić młotek, dowiadujemy się jednak, że aby go używać zaakceptować musimy licencję, która zabrania nam m.in. wbijania gwoździ produkowanych przez kogokolwiek innego, niż producent młotka, oraz użyczania młotka innym (np. sąsiadowi czy rodzinie); nie wolno nam też rozkładać młotka na części (np. w celu ulepszenia lub naprawy), ani używać młotka w pracy zarobkowej — to wymagało by wykupienia dodatkowej, znacznie droższej licencji.

Nie pomylę się zapewne, gdy powiem: większość z nas uzna taką sytuację za absurdalną i po prostu pójdzie kupić młotek gdzie indziej. Na jakiej podstawie producent młotka rości sobie prawo do decydowania, co mogę zrobić z należącym do mnie narzędziem?

Niestety, wiele narzędzi, których dziś używamy na co dzień, obwarowanych jest właśnie takimi zasadami. I o ile to, na jakie licencje i ograniczenia zgadzamy się w zaciszu domowym, to nasza prywatna sprawa, o tyle sytuacja, w której nauczyciel nie może udostępnić uczniowi narzędzi czy materiałów, które są niezbędne do nauki, ze względu na interesy firm trzecich — jest dla mnie sytuacją nie do zaakceptowania.

Nie chodzi o cenę

Wbrew wypowiedziom najczęściej bodaj pojawiającym się w debacie o otwartych zasobach edukacyjnych w Polsce (a takim zasobem mają być e-podręczniki), w otwartej edukacji i wolnym oprogramowaniu wcale nie chodzi o pieniądze. Chodzi przede wszystkim o wolność.

O to, by nauczyciel mógł wziąć materiały edukacyjne, i stworzyć na ich podstawie materiał dostosowany do grupy, z którą ma zajęcia. Oraz o to, by mógł te materiały — zarówno źródłowe, jak i przetworzone — przekazać swoim uczniom, ich rodzicom, czy innym nauczycielom, krzewiąc w ten sposób wiedzę jeszcze skuteczniej. I by mógł to wszystko zrobić bez obawy, że narusza czyjąś "własność intelektualną".

Recepta na sukces

Aby było to możliwe, narzędzia i materiały, z których korzystamy w procesie edukacji (i poza nim) muszą być wolne od obwarowań licencyjnych uniemożliwiających bądź utrudniających ich użycie, przetworzenie, rozpowszechnianie. Takie wolne materiały już istnieją — doskonały przykładem jest tu Wikipedia czy portal Wolne Lektury. Wszystkie niemal materiały, które tam znajdziemy, dostępne są na wolnych licencjach, co oznacza, że prawo ich wykorzystania, rozpowszechniania i tworzenia na ich podstawie ma każdy.

Obwarowania licencyjne nie mogą również dotyczyć oprogramowania, którego musimy użyć, by móc skorzystać z dobrodziejstw wolnych zasobów edukacyjnych. Cóż bowiem z tego, że dostanę otwarty podręcznik, jeśli mogę go odczytać czy przetworzyć wyłącznie wykorzystując oprogramowanie drogie lub takie, którego licencja zabrania mi rozpowszechniania dalej efektów mojej pracy? Zatem wszystkie materiały na wolnych licencjach powinny być dostępne w formie zrozumiałej przez wolne oprogramowanie (które, notabene, na ogół jest darmowe).

Jest jeszcze trzeci warunek: podobnie jak licencja na materiały edukacyjne nie może wykluczać żadnego ich użycia, i podobnie jak sposób ich podania (a więc np. format pliku, w którym są rozpowszechniane) nie może wykluczać użytkowników takiego czy innego oprogramowania, ich forma nie może również wykluczać osób niepełnosprawnych. Na przykład osoby niewidome, korzystające z czytników ekranu, nie są w stanie skorzystać z treści w postaci obrazków — wystarczy jednak dodać do tych obrazków w odpowiedni sposób dobry opis, by problem rozwiązać.

Otwartość a sprawa Polska

Choć wszystko to wydaje się dość niekontrowersyjne, wypromowanie takiego podejścia w Polsce zajęło Koalicji Otwartej Edukacji całe lata.

Dziś jednak, dzięki współpracy szeregu organizacji promujących otwartość w zastosowaniach edukacyjnych, dołączając jak co roku do globalnych obchodów trwającego właśnie Tygodnia Otwartej Edukacji, możemy wskazywać na konkretne projekty polskiego rządu, które tych trzech zasad się trzymają. Jak choćby projekt e-podręczników do kształcenia ogólnego.

Głodne mózgi

W cyfrowym świecie zapewnienie dostępu do edukacji i narzędzi jest z jednej strony znacznie łatwiejsze, z drugiej — nieco trudniejsze, niż w odniesieniu do narzędzi czy materiałów fizycznych.

Łatwiejsze, ponieważ o ile nie możemy zwyczajnie "skopiować" młotka, bez problemu poradzimy sobie ze skopiowaniem tekstu, materiału audio-video czy programu. Trudniejsze, ponieważ za tym, by utrudnić nam to kopiowanie stoją ogromne interesy.

Co oznacza, że nie istnieje dziś żadna techniczna bariera przed tym, by nakarmić wszystkie mózgi głodne wiedzy. Każdy umysł ludzki rozwija się, jeżeli jest karmiony wiedzą, my zaś pierwszy raz w historii możemy niemal bez kosztów każdemu tę wiedzę zapewnić!

Niestety, wciąż pojawiają się głosy, że jest to nieopłacalne. Nie dlatego, że kosztowałoby zbyt dużo — nie! Dlatego, że kosztowałoby zbyt mało.

Kwestia kontroli

Wykorzystując i tworząc otwarte zasoby edukacyjne, czy używając wolnego oprogramowania, wykorzystujemy narzędzia, nad którymi zachowujemy kontrolę. Producent młotka nie powinien móc decydować, co możemy z nim zrobić — nie musimy się na to również zgadzać w przypadku narzędzi cyfrowych.

I znów: nie chodzi o cenę. Są narzędzia darmowe, które nas ograniczają (np. popularnego komunikatora VoIP nie możemy, zgodnie z licencją, dać znajomemu, mimo że jest bezpłatny). Warto zwracać uwagę na to, czy oprogramowanie, z którego korzystamy, nie próbuje decydować za nas, co nam wolno, a czego nie.

Jak wszak zachować wpływ na gospodarkę i budować samorządność, jeśli nie mamy wpływu na narzędzia, z których korzystamy, i materiały, z których się uczymy?

Tekst powstał w ramach działań Koalicji Otwartej Edukacji wokół Tygodnia Otwartej Edukacji.

Blurry line between private service and public infrastructure

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This is my NetMundial content proposal, with some typos fixed and minor edits.


ICANN and IANA decentralisation efforts mark an important milestone in the evolution of the Internet: there is finally widespread recognition of the fact that centrally controlled bodies pose a threat to the free and open nature of the Internet. ICANN and IANA are, however, but a small part of a much larger problem.

More and more, communication platforms and methods are secondarily centralized; that is, in a network decentralized on lower protocol levels there are services being run that are centralized on higher levels. Running on a network based on open standards are closed services, that are then used by other entities as base for their services.

In other words, some private services — offering, for example, user authentication methods — are being used as a de facto infrastructure by large numbers of other entities.

If we recognize the dangers of centrally-controlled domain name system, we should surely recognize the danger of this phenomenon also.


It is of great value that the importance of decoupling IP addresses management and the domain name system management from a single state actor has been recognized and that currently there is a strong push towards multistakeholderism in this area.

There is, however, a secondary emergent centralization happening on the Internet, that potentially can pose a comparable, or even bigger, threat to the interconnected, open and independent nature of this global network.

This centralization is harder to perceive as dangerous, as it is not being actively supported by any state actor; hence, it falls under the radar for many Internet activists and technologists, that would react immediately had similar process been facilitated by a government. It does, however, have a potential to bring negative effects similar to a state-sponsored centralization of infrastructure.

Another reason for this process to happen unnoticed or for the possible negative effects of it to be depreciated is that it is fluid and emergent on behaviour of many actors, enforced by the network effect.

This process is most visibly exemplified in Facebook gathering over a 1 billion of users, by providing a centrally-controlled walled-garden, and at the same time offering an API to developers willing to tap-into this vast resource, for example to use it as authentication service. Now, many if not most Internet services requiring log-in as one of their options offer Facebook log-in. Some (a growing number) offer Facebook as the only option. Many offer commenting system devised by Facebook, that does not allow anonymous comments — a user has to have a Facebook account to be able to partake in the discussion.

Similarily, Google is forcing Google+ on YouTube users; to a lesser extent, Google Search is being used by a swath of Internet services as their default internal search engine (that is, used to search their own website or service). GMail is also by far the most popular e-mail and XMPP service, which gives Google immense power over both.

These are two examples of services offered by private entities (in this case, Google and Facebook) that had become a de facto public infrastructure, meaning that an immense number other services rely and require them to work.

If we recognize the danger of a single state actor controlling ICANN or IANA, we can surely recognize the danger of a single actor (regardless of whether it is a state actor or not) controlling such an important part of Internet infrastructure.

Regardless of reasons, why this situation emerged (users' lack of tech-savvy, service operators' want of easiest and cheapest to implement and integrate solutions, etc), it causes several problems for the free and open Internet:

  • it hurts resillience

If such a large part of services and actors depend on a single service (like Facebook or GMail), this in and of itself introduces a single point of failure. It is not entirely in the realm of the impossible for those companies to fail — who will, then, provide the service? We have also seen both of them (as any other large tech company) have large-scale downtime events, taking services based on them down also.

  • it hurts independence

In the most basic sense, any user of a service based on these de facto infrastructures has to comply with and agree to the underlying service (i.e. Facebook, Google) Terms of Service. If many or most of Internet services have that requirement, users and service operators alike lose independence over what they accept.

  • it hurts openness

Operators of such de facto infrastructures are not obliged to provide their services in an open and standard manner — running mostly in the application layer these services usually any attempts of interoperation. Examples include Twitter changing their API TOS to shut-off certain types of applications, Google announcing the planned shut-off of XMPP server-to-server communication, Facebook using XMPP for the internal chat service with server-to-server shut-off.

  • it hurts accountability and transparency

With such immense and binary ("either use it, or lose it") control over users' and other service providers' data, de facto infrastructure operators do not have any incentives to share information on what is happening with the data they gather. They also have no incentives to be transparent and open about their future plans or protocols used in their services. There is no accountability other than the binary decision to "use it or lose it", which is always heavily influenced by the network effect and the huge numbers of users of these services.

  • it hurts predictability

With no transparency, no accountability, and lack of standardization, such de facto infrastructure operators can act in ways that maximize their profits, which in turn can be highly unpredictable, and not in line with users' or the global Internet ecosystem's best interests. Twitters' changing of API TOS is a good example here.

  • it hurts interoperability

Such de facto infrastructure operators are strongly incentivised to shut-off any interoperability attempts. The larger the number of users of their service, the stronger the network effect, the more other services use their service, and the bigger the influence they can have on the rest of the Internet ecosystem. Social networks are a good example here — a Twitter user cannot communicate with a Facebook user, unless they also have an account on the other network.

This is obviously not the case with e-mail (I can run my own e-mail server), at least not yet. The more people use a single provider here (i.e. GMail), the stronger that provider becomes, and the easier it would be for its operator to shut-off interoperability with other providers. This is exactly what Google is doing with XMPP.

  • it hurts innovation

Lack of predictability, openness and independence obviously also hurts innovation. What used to be a free and open area of innovation is more and more becoming a set of closed-off walled-gardens controlled by a small number of powerful actors.

It is also worth noting that centralized infrastructure on any level (including the level of de facto infrastructure discussed herein) creates additional problems on human rights level: centralized infrastructure is easy to surveil and censor.

Hence, the first question to be asked is this: when does a private service become de facto public infrastructure?

At this point this question remains unanswered and there is not a single Internet Governance body, or indeed any actor, able to reply to it authoritatively. Nevertheless, we are all in dire need for an answer to this question, and I deem it a challenge for Internet Governance and an important topic that should be included in any Internet Governance Forums now and in the future.

The second question that ever more urgently requires an answer if we are to defend the open and not balkanized Internet is: what should be done about private services that have become de facto public infrastructure?

This question is also as of yet unanswered, but there are several possible proposals that can be made, including treating such situations as monopoly and breaking them up (so handling them outside Internet Governance), requiring public interoperable API available for other implementators, etc. This is perhaps not exactly in the purview of Internet Governance, it is however crucial for the Internet as a whole and I propose it be treated as a challenge to be art least considered at IGFs henceforth.


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Usually when I rant write about public consultations of some government ideas, there's not much good I can say. Well, for once this is not the case.

The Ministry of Administration and Digitization is working on their position for upcoming NetMundial Internet stakeholders meeting in Saõ Paulo. To prepare for that, the Ministry has announced a call for comments on a document prepared by the European Commission about Internet governance, and has invited several organisations and companies to weigh-in on the topic on a multistakeholder meeting in meatspace.

The topic is immensely important, and I hope to elaborate on that soon. In the meantime, however, I'd just like to say, that for some time now NGOs that are interested and competent in this area no longer have to knock on Ministries' doors. Instead, we're invited along ISPs, telcos, and large Internet companies, and can freely voice our opinions. Sometimes we even get listened-to.

Even better, this time one of the NGOs invited to comment and for the meeting was the Warsaw Hackerspace.

So we got @hackerspace.pl addresses into official ministerial communication, and two hackers into ministerial corridors. Expecting the media to go crazy about it in 3... 2... 1...